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CASE NOTES
CRIMINAL

LAW-EVIDENCE-ADMISSIBILITY OF EXTRANEOUS OF-

FENSES-EVIDENCE OF AN EXTRANEOUS OFFENSE OFFERED To

A

DEFENSIVE THEORY URGED By THE DEFENDANT

Is

REBUT

ADMISSIBLE

EVEN ABSENT A SHOWING THAT THE DEFENDANT WAS THE PERPETRATOR

OF THE EXTRANEOUS OFFENSE. Williams v. State, 481 S.W.2d

815 (Tex. Crim. App. 1972).
John Williams was convicted of knowingly and intentionally exposing, with lascivious intent, his private parts to a person under the age
of sixteen years.' The defendant attempted to contest the charge by
offering an alibi. As a rebuttal to this defensive theory, the trial court
allowed the state to introduce evidence of an extraneous offense. 2 The
state was unable, however, to prove that the defendant was the perpetrator of the other offense.
The defendant appealed to the court of criminal appeals urging that
the evidence concerning the extraneous offense could not be brought
within any of the recognized exceptions to the rule which prohibits the
introduction of evidence of extraneous offenses, that the trial court

erred in admitting evidence of the extraneous offense, and finally, that
the state had not proved that the defendant perpetrated the extraneous
offense. Held-Affirmed. Where evidence is offered to rebut the defensive issue there need not be proof that the defendant was the perpetrator
of the extraneous offense which may incidentally have been proved.
It appears firmly established that the defendant in a criminal case
can be convicted, "if at all, only by the evidence that shows he is guilty
of the offense charged."" Evidence that the defendant has committed
other crimes, remote and wholly disconnected from the offense for
4
which he is being tried, is generally inadmissible. The reason for this
is the obvious prejudicial effect that such evidence would have in the
outcome of his present trial.5 Thus, it is reversible error to admit evidence which tends only to show that the defendant is a criminal genI Tx. PENAL CODE ANN. art. 535c, § 1 (1952) provides: "It shall be unlawful for any
person with lascivious intent to knowingly and intentionally expose his or her private
parts or genital organs to any other person, male or female, under the age of sixteen

(16) years."
2

Williams v. State, 481 S.W.2d 815 (Tex. Crim. App. 1972).

3 E.g., Blakenship v. State, 448 S.W.2d 476, 480 ('rex. Crim. App. 1969).

4 Franklin v. State, 163 Tex. Crim. 330, 291 S.W.2d 322 (1956).
5 Taylor v. State, 138 Tex. Crim. 161, 164, 134 S.W.2d 277, 279 (1939). The issues coming
within the exceptions, such as intent and identity, must be controverted. If, for example,
the state has sufficient proof of the defendant's intent, evidence of an extraneous offense
which shows intent is inadmissible. The reason for this is that the evidence of the extraneous offense would serve no further purpose than to prejudice the accused, since his
intent has already been established. See, e.g., Gardner v. State, 55 Tex. Crim. 400, 117 S.W.

148 (1909).
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erally. 6 There are, however, several well recognized exceptions. Evidence of extraneous offenses is admissible to show identity, 7 intent,8
system,9 scienter, 10 motive," and malice.' 2 It is also admissible to show
14
the defendant's failure to have reformed, 13 to impeach his credibility,
and to controvert a defensive theory advanced by him.' 5
If the evidence of the other offense is admitted on the basis of being
within one of the exceptions, the trial judge is required to limit the
scope of the jury's consideration of the offense strictly to the purpose
for which it was admitted. 6 Thus, if it was offered to prove the defendant's intent in committing the crime, the trial court must instruct the
jury that they are not to consider the extraneous offense beyond its function of establishing intent. 17 Failure to include this instruction may
constitute reversible error.'8
It is generally held, however, that, even when coming within one of

the well defined exceptions, evidence of an extraneous offense is only admissible if it is shown that the defendant was the perpetrator of the
other offense.' 9
It is axiomatic that when extraneous offenses are admitted, the

jury must be told that they cannot consider them unless the State

proves that the accused committed such collateral crimes. This
being so, no extraneous offense should be offered unless the State
20

is prepared to prove that the accused committed the same.

This raises the question of the degree of proof necessary to establish
the defendant as the perpetrator of the other offense. The degree of proof
required varies in different jurisdictions, 21 but Texas has settled on
Taylor v. State, 138 Tex. Crim. 161, 134 S.W.2d 277 (1939).
7 Wagner v. State, 463 S.W.2d 432 (rex. Crim. App. 1971).
8 Gregory v. State, 449 S.W.2d 248 (Tex. Crim. App. 1970).
9 Garcia v. State, 455 S.W.2d 271 (Tex. Crim. App. 1970). Texas law on "system" is
distinguished from that of other jurisdictions insofar as in Texas "system" cannot be
shown by collateral crimes unless they develop the res gestae, show intent, or connect the
defendant with the offense charged. This is based on the reasoning that similarity of acts
the time do not ipso facto constitute "system." 1 H. UNDERHILL, A TREATISE ON THE LAW
OF CRIMINAL EVIDENCE § 212, at 507 (5th ed. 1956). The distinction between "system" and
"systematic crimes" is discussed in Cone v. State, 86 Tex. Crim. 291, 293, 216 S.W. 190, 191
6

(1919).

10 E.g., Lytton v. State, 131 TEx. C~iM. 654, 101 S.W.2d 564 (1936).
11 Watson v. State, 146 Tex. Crim. 425, 175 S.W.2d 423 (1943).
12 E.g., Lytton v. State, 131 Tex. Crim. 654, 101 S.W.2d 564 (1936).
18 Castillo v. State, 411 S.W.2d 741 (Tex. Crim. App. 1967).
14 Giacona v. State, 124 Tex. Crim. 141, 62 S.W.2d 986 (1933).
15 Chambers v. State, 462 S.W.2d 313, 315 (Tex. Crim. App. 1970).
16 Harris v. State, 55 Tex. Crim. 469, 479, 117 S.W. 839, 844 (1909).
'7 Id. at 478, 117 S.W. at 844.
18 Coker v. State, 35 Tex. Crim. 57, 31 S.W. 655 (1895).
19
Tomlinson v. State, 422 S.W.2d 474 (Tex. Crim. App. 1967).
20 Id. at 474 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
21 For example, in Arizona the defendant must be shown to be the perpetrator of the
extraneous offense with some certainty, but not beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Waits,
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the "beyond a reasonable doubt" criteria. 22 It is also necessary to prove
fact, occur. 28 This, too, must be
that the extraneous offense did, in
24

shown beyond a reasonable doubt.

The Williams decision defines, apparently for the first time, an exception to these prerequisites. If the evidence of the extraneous offense
is admitted to rebut a defensive theory advanced by the defendant, it is
no longer necessary to prove that the defendant perpetrated the other offense. In the opening paragraph of his vigorous dissent, Presiding Judge
Onion delineates the import of the holding: "Today 'the majority'
adopts a broad, new and dangerous rule-an exception to an exception
which finds no support in the law or the particular facts of this case. ' ' 25
The facts of the case are complex but the impact of the majority's
decision can be fully appreciated only upon a careful review of the pertinent details. The two girl victims were on their way to a drugstore in
San Antonio and claim the defendant drove up in his car and offered
them a ride. One of the girls looked into the car and saw that he was
nude from the waist down. The girls were able to get the license number of the car, GYW 916, and reported the incident to the police. A
car bearing that license number was registered to the defendant's wife.
The incident occurred at approximately 7:45 p.m. on June 13, 1969.
The defendant offered evidence showing that at 7:45 p.m. on June
13, 1969, he was in Aransas Pass with his wife and mother, 150 miles
from San Antonio. A motel manager in Aransas Pass verified this, testifying that they arrived in a pickup and checked into her hotel. The
defendant's father claimed that he left San Antonio for Aransas Pass
at about 3:00 a.m. on June 14 in the car registered to the defendant's
wife and reached his destination at about daybreak. He added that the
car he arrived in, a cream colored, four door Buick, was the one customarily driven by the defendant but had been parked across the street
from his house with the keys in the ignition. The defendant's mother
corroborated this testimony, adding that she, the defendant and his wife
left Aransas Pass in the car on June 15 for a visit with her mother in
Brownsville, not returning to San Antonio until June 24, 1969. Her
husband returned to San Antonio in the pickup.
The state was allowed to introduce evidence of an extraneous offense
404 P.2d 729 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1965). California requires some certainty also, mere suspicion
is not enough. People v. McCullough, 322 P.2d 289 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1962).
22 Lankford v. State, 93 Tex. Crim. 442, 248 S.W. 389 (1923). In the past, however, the
court of criminal appeals has used such phrases as "evidence [which] strongly tend[s] to
connect appellant" with the extraneous offense. Williams v. State, 38 Tex. Crim. 128, 137,
41 S.W. 645, 648 (1897); "reasonable certainty," Fountain v. State, 90 Tex. Crim. 474, 477,
241 S.W. 489, 491 (1921); "[s]atisfactorily shown to be a party to the commission of such
offense," Shepherd v. State, 143 Tex. Crim. 387, 389, 158 S.W.2d 1010, 1011 (1942).
28 Pelton v. State, 60 Tex. Crim. 412, 132 S.W. 480 (1910).
24 Id. at 420, 132 S.W. at 484.
25 Williams v. State, 481 S.W.2d 815, 819 (Tex. Crim. App. 1972).
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in rebuttal to this defensive theory. A fifteen-year-old girl testified that
she and a girlfriend had been approached by a man in a white car
bearing license number GYW 916. The man was completely nude.
This incident occurred on June 18, 1969. The witness was unable to
identify the defendant as having been the offender and, consequently,
no charges were filed against him.
The majority emphasized that the main purpose of admitting the
evidence was that it served to rebut the defensive theory of alibi, and
that the evidence revealing an extraneous offense was only incidental
to this main purpose. Judge Onion suggests in his dissent that the
defense of alibi could have been rebutted without admitting the details
of the extraneous offense.
The fact that a witness or witnesses saw an automobile bearing
license number GYW 916 in San Antonio on June 18, 1969, would
have been admissible in light of appellant's alibi testimony, but to
permit the State to go further and show an extraneous offense and
the details thereof without showing that the appellant was the
offender was error in my opinion .... 26
Judge Onion seems to be suggesting that the main purpose in admitting
the testimony could have been served without introducing the preju27
dicial effect of the details of the extraneous offense.
As justification for affirming the trial court's decision to admit the
evidence of the extraneous offense, the majority sought to establish a
distinction between the exception of rebuttal of a defensive theory
and all other exceptions allowing for the admission of this type of
evidence. The distinction was essential to their holding since it has
always been indispensable that the state show the defendant to be the
perpetrator of the extraneous offense as a necessary prerequisite to its
admissibility. 28 The court was faced with overruling the necessity of
proving the defendant was the perpetrator for all exceptions, or finding
some special basis for dispensing with the requirement for the excep26 Id. at 820.
27 Id. at 820. judge Odom, in a concurring opinion, also recognizes that the state had a
right to show that the defendant's automobile was in San Antonio on June 18, 1969 for
the purpose of impeaching the defendant's witnesses and rebutting the defensive issue.
The details of the extraneous offense, according to Judge Odom, were also admissible but
for a different reason than that of the majority: "A witness should be permitted to testify
concerning collateral facts that serve to fix in his memory a material fact to which he has

testified." Id. at 819 (concurring opinion). Judge Odom cites Wigmore in providing the

reason for the rule.
The party offering a witness may desire to make plain the strength of the witness'
grounds of knowledge and the reasons for trusting his belief . . . the general rule is
that a witness may on direct examination state the particular circumstances which
legitimately affected his knowledge or recollection, even though the fact would
otherwise be inadmissible ....
II J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 655 (3d ed. 1940).
28 Lankford v. State, 93 Tex. Crim. 442, 248 S.W. 389 (1923).
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tion of rebuttal of a defensive theory only. The majority chose the latter
and the result was, to repeat Judge Onion, "an exception to an exception." The holding was apparently without precedent, Judge Onion
declaring:
In support of such position the majority cites no authority but
asks the reader to "compare" Chambers v. State, [and] Hart v.
State, both opinions by this writer. Neither stands for the proposition that extraneous offenses or transactions may be29 offered
without a showing that the accused is the perpetrator.
In defining the distinction the majority concentrated on the fact that
the state did not introduce the evidence complained of for the purpose
of showing a separate offense, but for the purpose of rebutting the
defensive theory. The showing of the extraneous offense was only
incidental to the main purpose. While the truth of this cannot be disputed, it fails to establish a distinguishing feature of the rebuttal of a
defensive theory exception. The showing of an extraneous offense is
also often merely incidental to the resolution of the main issues of
intent, identity, motive, and malice.
Certain issues are so vital to the determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused that even evidence which will have probable prejudicial effect is admitted. The rationale behind the exceptions seems
to be that the necessity of resolving the issue outweighs the prejudicial
effect.8 0 Determination of the truth of a defensive theory is but one of
these issues-identity, intent, etc. are also included. In resolving these
issues the showing of an extraneous offense is often no more than a
necessary vehicle of expediency, not meant to be an end in itself, but
merely a means of resolving the issue. In discussing the defensive theory
advanced by the defendant in Williams, the majority recognized this
saying that "the State's evidence tended to show an extraneous offense
was incidental to the purpose for which it was offered." 8 1 This, however, is not a feature peculiar to the exception of rebuttal of a defensive
29 Williams v. State, 481 S.W.2d 815, 820 (rex. Grim. App. 1972) (dissenting opinion)
(emphasis added) (citations omitted). Judge Onion further stated that in Chambers v.
State, 462 S.W.2d 313 (Tex. Crim. App. 1969), the witness did not testify that the defendant
had been engaged in a criminal offense, but merely reported suspicious conduct of a
group of men, one of whom was the defendant, to the police. In Hart v. State, 447 S.W.2d
944 (Tex. Grim. App. 1969), the defendant was clearly identified as being involved in the
extraneous offense.
30 It is on this aspect that Judge Odom concentrates. Williams v. State, 481 S.W.2d 815,
819 (Tex. Grim. App. 1972) (concurring opinion). When the relevance of the evidence may
outweigh its probable prejudicial effect, it is admissible. In such a case, the prejudicial
effect should be alleviated as much as possible by a limiting instruction from the trial
judge. Considerable discretion is allowed the trial judge in his determination of whether
evidence is admissible. On appeal, reversal is granted only upon a showing of clear abuse
of this discretion. Lanham v. State, 474 S.W.2d 197 (rex. Grim. App. 1971).
81 Williams v. State, 481 S.W.2d 815, 822 (rex. Grim. App. 1972).
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theory, but has equal validity when applied to many cases where intent,
identity, motive, etc. are in question.
The majority cites a passage from Ivey v. State3 2 which purportedly
recognized the distinction and treated defensive theory as being unique.
In that case, the defendant urged a defensive theory saying that he was
subject to epileptic seizures and was physically weak, therefore incapable of committing the crime of aggravated assault and battery. In
rebuttal, the state offered evidence of another assault committed by the
defendant. The court held it to be admissible.
The state, for the purpose of showing the improbability of his
defensive theory, introduced the evidence complained of. Under
such a state of facts, the evidence became admissible notwithstanding it tended to show an extraneous offense. Of course, the evidence was not admissible for the purpose of impeachment, or
showing intent, identity, etc. We did not base our opinion holding
it admissible upon any such theory. One of the best known exceptions to the rule against proving extraneous crimes is that any
competent evidence which tends to defeat the defense urged is
admissible though it tends to show another offense 83
In the last sentence of this passage, the court is very specific in stating
the rule as it applied to that case. A more general, all encompassing
statement of the rule, however, is that any competent evidence is admissible though it tends to show another offense.3 4 In this connection,
"competent" evidence is evidence that comes within any of the exceptions. 5 Thus, in Ivey, the court was not so much defining a distinction
as merely applying the rule for admissibility to one particular exception.
The language of the majority in detailing the peculiar characteristics
of the rebuttal of a defensive theory exception has also been used by the
court of criminal appeals in connection with other exceptions. The
case of Bruno v. State3 6 serves as an example. The defendant had been
convicted of aggravated assault. The victim testified that he had first
met the defendant while working as a guard in the Texas Prison
System. Upon further questioning by the state, it developed that the
defendant had been a prisoner at the time. The defendant objected on
the grounds that the statement showed an extraneous offense. The
objection was overruled. The court of criminal appeals affirmed holding
that no motive for the assault could be established other than as a consequence of this prior relationship between the defendant and the prosecuting witness.
82 152 Tex. Crim. 206, 212 S.W.2d 146 (1948).

83 Id. at 209, 212 S.W.2d at 148 (emphasis added).
34 Moore v. United States, 150 U.S. 57, 14 S. Ct. 26, 37 L. Ed. 996 (1893).
385 Cf. Moore v. United States, 150 U.S. 57, 14 S. Ct. 26, 37 L. Ed. 996 (1893).

86 163 Tex. Crim. 540, 295 S.W.2d 211 (1956).
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Evidence which is pertinent and tends to prove the offense alleged
or motive is not rendered inadmissible because it also shows or
tends to show
that the defendant had been convicted of a col37
lateral crime.

Thus, the evidence showing motive was admissible, although it incidentally showed an extraneous offense. Evidence coming within other
exceptions has also been admitted though the showing of an extraneous
8
offense was only an incident to another purpose.3
In Williams, the court announced a holding unsupported by precedent. The question of whether the defendant perpetrated the extraneous offense is no longer relevant when the offense is introduced to
rebut a defensive theory. The majority was understandably unwilling
to extend this doctrine to the other exceptions. The attempt to set
aside the rebuttal of a defensive theory exception, however, as deserving
of special status, fails in the face of logic and precedent. While there
are differences between the rebuttal exception and the exception of
intent, malice, etc., the difference relied upon by the majority is questionable. Even conceding that the distinction as outlined by the majority is valid, it is difficult to see how it provides sound justification for
the new rule. Drawing again on the words of Judge Onion:
The rule forbidding the introduction of other crimes is one of
evidence and arises out of a fundamental demand for justice and
fairness. This general rule should be strictly enforced where applicable because of the prejudicial effect and injustice of such
evidence and should not be departed from except under conditions
which clearly justify such a departure and are necessary.
The action taken by "the majority" neither supported by the
law or facts is totally unjustified.3 9
Daniel I. Sheehan, Jr.
37
38

Id. at 545, 295 S.W.2d at 213 (emphasis added).

E.g., Knauf v. State, 108 Tex. Crim. 590, 2 S.W.2d 229 (1928)(identity); Meredith v.
State, 115 Tex. Crim. 447, 27 S.W.2d 222 (1930)(knowledge).
39 Williams v. State, 481 S.W.2d 815, 822 (Tex. Crim. App. 1972) (dissenting opinion).
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